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ABSTRACT: The main goal of the following article is to offer a Foucauldian reading of the eco-
nomic governance structure of the European Union after the reforms passed and implemented 
over the last six years. The starting point is a reconstruction of Foucault’s analytical framework to 
scrutinize disciplinary power as well as the respective apparatuses and how this framework has 
been integrated into the more encompassing governmentality perspective. In the second section I 
provide a brief survey of the strategic terrain of the European Union as a site of multi-level gov-
ernance that poses unique challenges from a governing perspective. The following sections are 
structured according to some key characteristics of disciplinary/governmental power arrange-
ments (visibilization, norm(aliz)ation, prevention, normalizing judgement) which I try to identify 
in the context of the European Semester, the Six-Pack and the Macroeconomic Imbalance Proce-
dure as elements of a broader disciplinary framework. The final section draws on Foucault’s fa-
mous point about the ‘productive failure’ of the prison as a disciplinary apparatus that ends up 
serving ends and purposes quite distinct from the ones officially declared and suggests that we 
should also consider the European regime of economic discipline and surveillance as one, which 
is ‘failing forward’, creating opportunity structures to pursue political projects that may differ 
markedly from those officially stated. 
 
Keywords: Discipline, Governmentality, European Union, Sovereign Debt Crisis 
 
Introduction1 
Forty years ago, Michel Foucault’s Discipline and Punish was published, and although it was at-
tacked in some quarters as being alarmist and overly dystopian at the time, from a contemporary 
vantage point it seems as if Foucault had almost underrated the possibilities of all-encompassing 
                                                 
1 This paper was first presented at the conference Überwachen und Strafen heute in Bremen, November 5-7, 2015. 
The author would like to thank the participants as well as the two anonymous reviewers for Foucault Studies for 
their helpful comments.  




surveillance and (self-)monitoring. Discipline and Punish was and remains noteworthy for a num-
ber of reasons. Arguably, the most important contribution of the book is the first elaborate formu-
lation of an innovative and somewhat heterodox understanding of power that does not manifest 
itself primarily in repression, but rather in the constitution of various phenomena from discourses 
to subjects; it is a productive power that Foucault calls discipline.  
The aim of this paper is to make use of Foucault’s insights regarding disciplinary power 
and to take seriously his emphasis on illuminating the micro-level workings of power, which was 
always an integral part of the genealogical endeavor, and which contains a transformative poten-
tial: It is only once we have a clear understanding of how disciplinary practices and the institu-
tions built around them operate that oppositional efforts may stand a chance of establishing dif-
ferent power relations and not just the same patterns in new disguises.2 Foucault’s toolkit to de-
tect and analyze disciplinary power has been put to productive use in any number of different 
contexts from the contemporary regime of punishment and incarceration3 to the micro-practices 
that subject the (female) body to disciplinary regimes.4 In this paper I will apply the toolkit of 
Foucault’s analytics of power to a realm in which it has rarely ever been used before, namely the 
European Union (EU) and the national economies of its member states. More specifically, I will 
investigate what significance disciplinary techniques and practices have had in the government(-
ality) of the European Union after and in response to the Sovereign Debt Crisis.  
Before I can turn to this main part of the paper, a number of preliminary remarks are 
needed to address three points. First, as will have been noticed, my approach here is not strictly 
genealogical along the lines of Discipline and Punishment; rather, I am interested in the role that 
disciplinary techniques and practices play in a more encompassing project of ‘governing Europe’, 
which means I will have to provide at least a very brief sketch of the governmentality perspective 
as it was developed in Foucault’s lectures at the Collège de France 1977-79 and how disciplinary 
elements fit into it. As I will try to show, the governing of Europe (of course, only in the limited 
sense of trying to set up a regime of public finance discipline) relies on what almost amounts to a 
hybrid of disciplinary and governmental power, of which, in some instances the former and in 
others the latter is more pronounced.  
Secondly, I am interested in the way national economies in the EU are subjected to disci-
plinary/governmental techniques and practices by supranational institutions, which prompts the 
question as to how unique this constellation is and to what extent we may extrapolate from simi-
lar relations in the setting of more or less federalist states. This will also give me an opportunity to 
                                                 
2 “… and that since these things have been made, they can be unmade, as long as we know how it was that they 
were made.” Michel Foucault (1983) ‘Critical Theory / Intellectual History,’ in Michel Foucault Politics, Philoso-
phy, Culture: Interviews and other Writings 1977-1984, pp. 17-46, 37.  
3 See, for example, Garland (2014) ‘What is a ‘history of the present’? On Foucault’s genealogies and their critical 
preconditions,’ Punishment & Society 16: 365-384. https://doi.org/10.1177/1462474514541711.  
4 See, for example, Susan Bordo (1993) Unbearable Weight: Feminism, Western Culture, and the Body. Berkeley: 
Berkeley University Press. 
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introduce readers unfamiliar with the barrage of reforms in economic governance structures in 
Europe since 2011 to some of their key elements. Finally, I will briefly review the scarce literature 
on the subject – approached from this particular angle – to highlight the existing findings as well 
as the questions that remain open. Based on this clearing of theoretical and empirical ground, the 
paper will proceed to illustrate the workings of a disciplinary/governmental regime in the re-
formed governance structures of the Eurozone and EU with reference to five broad themes: Visi-
bilization/constitution, normation/normalization, prevention, normalizing judgment and, finally, 
productive failure. 
 
Discipline and Governmentality 
For those interested in Foucault’s work, it has always been a challenge to take proper account of 
the various shifts, e.g. from archeology to genealogy and from there to governmentality and the 
techniques of the self that preoccupied the late Foucault of the 1980s. He himself retrospectively 
suggested that his work had unfolded rather stringently along the three axes of truth, power and 
the subject that he had pursued in various combinations at different times.5 This seems a little too 
conciliatory in the light of the well-documented phases of frustration with his own work, explicit 
self-criticisms and the abandonment or at least thorough revision of large parts of entire research 
agendas. Still, the point of bringing up such shifts is not to portray Foucault’s oeuvre as a loosely 
connected set of disparate agendas, but rather to remind us of the dynamics in his thought and 
the concepts and analyses engendered by it.  
In the present context, there is no need to delve too deeply into the various reasons behind 
those dynamics. What is of interest to the project pursued here is solely the relation between Fou-
cault’s notion of discipline and the consecutive project of writing a “’history’ of governmentali-
ty.”6  
To be sure, the history of governmentality is not a genealogy like Discipline and Punish.7 
More importantly, though, the self-criticism of the genealogical project in its various aspects, in-
cluding the notion of discipline, does not lead Foucault to abandon it altogether. His work, thus, 
should not be understood as a sequence of replacements, but rather a process of “intensification”8 
or, as I would suggest, a process of enrichment. Earlier perspectives and concepts may recede into 
the relative background at times, but many of them continue to inform the reformulated or newly 
taken up agendas even if they are not mentioned explicitly. And at the very moment when he 
introduces the novel vocabulary of power in the first lecture of 1978, Foucault is eager to point out 
                                                 
5 Michel Foucault (1984) “The Ethics of the Concern of the Self as a Practice of Freedom,’ in Michel Foucault 
(1997) Ethics, pp. 281-301, 281. New York: The New Press. 
6 Michel Foucault (2007) Security, Territory, Population. Lectures at the Collège de France 1977-78, p. 108. New 
York: Palgrave. 
7 See Thomas Biebricher (2008) ‘Genealogy and Governmentality’, Journal of the Philosophy of History 2: 363-396. 
8 Jeffrey Nealon (2008) Foucault beyond Foucault: Power and its Intensifications since 1984, p. 5. Stanford: Stanford 
University Press. 




that this also goes for the relation between discipline and government(ality). Just as disciplinary 
power has not ‘replaced’ sovereign or juridical power, it is, in turn, not eliminated by the rise of 
government or the concomitant apparatuses of security:  
 
So, disciplinary mechanisms do not appear just from the eighteenth century; they are already present 
within the juridico-legal code. […] Conversely, I could say that if we take the mechanisms of security 
[…] it is quite clear that this does not constitute any bracketing off or cancellation of juridico-legal struc-
tures or disciplinary mechanisms. […] So, there is not a series of successive elements, the appearance of 
the new causing the earlier ones to disappear. There is not the legal age, the disciplinary age, and then 
the age of security. […] In reality, you have a series of complex edifices…9  
 
These passages come from the very first of the governmentality lectures, in which Foucault still 
refers to “security” as the new form of power, but already two weeks later it becomes clear that 
the mechanisms and apparatuses of security that operate in a different manner from their disci-
plinary counterparts are better understood as technologies that are employed in what Foucault 
considers a specific form of power, which he now calls government and which is directed primar-
ily at the population: “I think that the series, mechanisms of security – population – government 
and the opening of the field that we call politics, should be analyzed.”10 Accordingly, as Foucault 
shifts his attention more and more to the problem of government and governmentalities, i.e. the 
“reflected practices of government”11, he once more adamantly dismisses a view that would in-
terpret the conceptual dynamics in his work as consecutive replacements:  
 
So we should not see things as the replacement of a society of sovereignty by a society of discipline, and 
then of a society of discipline by a society, say, of government. In fact we have a triangle: sovereignty, 
discipline, and governmental management.12  
 
How exactly the three constitutive elements of this ‘governmental triangle’ are connected, is 
something to be investigated in any given concrete case, but the point worth emphasizing here is 
that an encompassing analysis based on the governmentality perspective would have to contain 
an inquiry into the disciplinary element of what I have called the ‘governmental triangle’. This is 
important because while most scholars working in what has come to be called Governmentality 
Studies are probably familiar with this passage, in the fervor of what William Walters has called 
“applicationism”13 in some quarters of it, attention to the ‘non-governmental’ sides of the triangle, 
                                                 
9 Foucault, Security, Territory, Population, p. 7.  
10 Ibid., p. 76.  
11 Michel Foucault (2008) The Birth of Biopolitics. Lectures at the Collège de France 1978-79, p. 75. New York: Pal-
grave. 
12 Foucault, Security, Territory, Population, p. 107. See also: “As for discipline, this is not eliminated either.“ Ibid. 
13 William Walters (2012) Governmentality: Critical Encounters, p. 143. New York: Routledge. 
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namely discipline, let alone sovereignty, often falls to the wayside.14 So in the following analysis, 
my aim is to highlight specifically the disciplinary aspects in their intertwinement with the gov-
ernmental dimension of this triangle in the context of the restructured governance of the Europe-
an Union. Put in a slightly more ambitious way, I attempt to make a contribution to an analytics 
of what might be called the governmentality of the European Union with regard to some of its 
economic and financial governance structures.15  
A final clarification with regard to the usage of these concepts is required here before we 
can move on. First, as will become clear, (national) sovereignty in the sense of a claim to non-
intervention into internal affairs by other nations or supranational entities is at the heart of the 
mechanisms and regimes I will analyze in the following. However, since Foucault’s specific un-
derstanding of sovereignty is centered on the “right to decide life and death”16 on behalf of the 
sovereign, which is not immediately at stake in the matters to be discussed, I will not draw on this 
element of the ‘governmental triangle’ in my analysis, not least because this would also exceed 
the spatial boundaries of an article. Secondly, Foucault introduced the categories of disciplinary 
power employed below as techniques applied to the individual body, so it may seem a stretch to 
introduce national economies as objects of discipline. Still, Foucault himself encouraged unortho-
dox uses of his ‘toolbox’ when he referred to his writings as “‘game openings’”17 introduced to 
elicit creative responses, rather than emulation. Thus, just as it may be useful and instructive to 
consider forms of government(-ality) that are not confined exclusively to a population as their 
object, as research on “the government of things”18 illustrates, I hope to show that it may be equal-
ly instructive to analyze disciplinary techniques applied to national economies instead of indi-
vidual bodies: Discipline in intertwinement with more governmental techniques can be brought 
to bear on this level as well to the effect of more or less effectively influencing behavior and pur-
sue even more encompassing strategic aims. Do the disciplines produce the ‘collective soul’ of 
those economies analogously to what they supposedly affect in the individual according to Fou-
cault? This may seem far-fetched, but at the same time, and although I will not systematically fol-
low up on this claim here, we cannot dismiss this constitutive dimension of power in this context: 
Who would deny that the various collective actors, the dramatis personae, have been constituted 
                                                 
14 There are, however, notable exceptions; see for example Mitchell Dean (2007) Governing Societies: Political Per-
spectives on international and domestic Rule. New York: Open University Press. 
15 Restrictions of space do not permit me to discuss the rich literature on governmentality here, which, neverthe-
less, has hardly ever been used for an analysis of the European Union. For an overview, see Walters, Governmen-
tality, and Thomas Biebricher (2015) ‘Governmentality’, in Mark Bevir / Rod Rhodes eds., The Routledge Handbook 
of Interpretive Political Science (New York: Routledge), pp. 141-154. 
16 Michel Foucault (1990) The History of Sexuality. Volume I: An Introduction, p. 135. New York: Vintage Books. 
17 Michel Foucault (1980) ‘Questions of Method,’ in Michel Foucault (1994) Power, pp. 223-238, 224. New York: 
New Press. 
18 Thomas Lemke (2015) ‘New Materialisms: Foucault and the ‘Government of Things’’ Theory, Culture, Society 
32: 3-25. https://doi.org/10.1177/0263276413519340.  




as cliché characters (the profligate and cunning Greeks; the authoritarian and rule-fixated Ger-
mans etc.) in what Mark Blyth has called a “morality play” over debt unfolding in Europe and 
elsewhere.19 
 
The European Union – An unidentified political object in times of crises 
With the theoretical grounds cleared to some extent, let us take at least a cursory look at the em-
pirical setting in question and in what ways it may be considered somewhat unique. The Europe-
an Union is a phenomenon sui generis in many respects, or at least this is the default answer to the 
perennial questions related to its basic political form: Is it a federation of sovereign nation states, a 
supranational, albeit federalist state in the making, or even something altogether different, possi-
bly a postmodern empire?20 It is impossible to discuss these intriguing questions here in a more 
detailed manner, but the first thing to note is that it seems, for the time being, questionable to ana-
lyze the matters at hand, i.e. issues of economic policy and fiscal discipline, in analogy to what we 
are accustomed to at the nation state level, and simply assume that European states are the equiv-
alent of subnational entities (provinces, municipalities) that are integrated into a hierarchical state 
structure as if they were the constitutive elements of the ‘United States of Europe’. On the other 
hand, it is far from convincing either to claim that European nation states are sovereign in the full 
sense of the term, to the effect that, strictly speaking, they cannot be forced to do anything, espe-
cially when it comes to such core competences as the treasured ‘power of the purse’ of national 
parliaments.  
To be sure, we are well advised not to overstate the singularity of the European arrange-
ments. After all, only the most unitary and centralist states leave no degree of fiscal autonomy at 
all to sub-state units such as provinces and municipalities, and more federalist states actually 
make it a point to grant such autonomy to a considerable degree, at least formally. So it may seem 
as if sub-state units would not differ too much from European nation states in terms of economic 
sovereignty. However, de facto, fiscal autonomy of sub-state jurisdictions is restrained significant-
ly even where it is granted formally by the fact that most of the tax revenue flow is channeled 
through the nation state and then redistributed to the sub-state units. In other words, because for 
many if not most sub-state jurisdictions it is difficult to survive on the basis of the revenue they 
generate themselves (state taxes; community fees etc.), states have some leverage over sub-state 
jurisdictions to ‘push’ their politics in a certain direction, which may amount to being effectively 
forced to adopt certain economic policies.21 There is no real equivalent of this kind of leverage at 
                                                 
19 Mark Blyth (2013) Austerity: The History of a Dangerous Idea. New York: Oxford University Press. 
20 See Jan Zielonka (2006) Europe as Empire: The Nature of the Enlarged European Union. Oxford: Oxford University 
Press. https://doi.org/10.1093/0199292213.001.0001.  
21 Jamie Peck has shown how, in contrast, in the United States as a federal state, austerity politics are effectively 
‘pushed’ down from the federal to the state and municipal level. Jamie Peck (2014) ‘Pushing Austerity: state 
failure, municipal bankruptcy and the crises of fiscal federalism in the USA,’ Cambridge Journal of Regions, Econo-
my and Society 7: 17-44. https://doi.org/10.1093/cjres/rst018.  
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the supranational level of the EU. On the contrary, it is the EU that could not survive on its own 
since its budget is mostly financed by member states’ dues.  
Let me sum up this somewhat unique situation: The reforms of economic governance 
structures of the EU that I will sketch out momentarily are measures aimed to constrain actors in 
a particularly challenging strategic setting. The actors in question are formally sovereign states, 
politically speaking, i.e. as a last resort they could always leave the European Union if they chose 
to, so they cannot be forced to comply with certain political decisions22 in the same way sub-state 
jurisdictions might be, especially in highly centralist settings. Nevertheless, economically speak-
ing, the members of the Eurozone sharing a common currency, but also, to a lesser degree, mem-
bers of the common market, have long lost their full sovereignty.23 They find themselves in a 
deeply interdependent setting, in which coordination in matters of economic policy broadly un-
derstood is of preeminent importance. This setting of urgently needed coordination (to put it 
somewhat euphemistically) with somewhat restricted enforceability is the terrain upon which the 
disciplinary techniques and apparatuses in question will have to operate on.  
What are these apparatuses and techniques and how have they been reformed and refined 
over the last five years in response to the string of crises? I will not spend too much time talking 
about apparatuses because this is not primarily an institutionalist analysis and the focus is on 
grasping and making intelligible disciplinary techniques, or what Foucault once referred to as 
“the panoptic modality of power”.24 However, the main institutional sites of disciplinary activity 
are easily identifiable: They are the European Commission, which we will come across repeatedly 
in the more detailed discussion of the disciplinary workings in economic governance, and, more 
recently, the European Central Bank (ECB), which has acquired considerable leverage over ailing 
national economies in the Eurozone because it can simply threaten to cut off the money supply or, 
what amounts to almost the same, stop buying government bonds off secondary markets. Despite 
all the talk about ‘renationalization’ in the EU, at least with regard to economic matters, both in-
stitutions have experienced a remarkable increase in importance due to the crisis, which has also 
prompted critical debates over these transformations.25  
                                                 
22 Unless they are enshrined in the European Treaties or European Law, but even then it is not a foregone con-
clusion, as we will see below.  
23 See on these matters of financial autonomy and sovereignty also William Davies (2014) The Limits of Neoliberal-
ism: Authority, Sovereignty and the Logic of Competition. London: Sage. https://doi.org/10.4135/9781473906075, and 
Joseph Vogl (2014) ‘The Sovereignty Effect: Markets and Power in the Economic Regime,’ Qui Parle? 23 (1), 125-
155. https://doi.org/10.5250/quiparle.23.1.0125.  In this context it is also important to note that the introduction of 
the Euro itself could be seen as having disciplinary effects because it makes a certain form of interjurisdictional 
competition, namely currency devaluation, impossible among the members of the European Monetary Union. 
As important and interesting this issue is, the discussion of the effects – and defects – of the Euro from a gov-
ernmentality perspective lie beyond the scope of this essay. 
24 Michel Foucault (1991) Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison, p. 221. London: Penguin. 
25 See Michael Bauer and Stefan Becker (2014) ‘Debate: From the front line to the back stage – how the financial 
crisis has quietly strengthened the European Commission,’ Public Money & Management 43: 161-163. 
 




Let us now take a look at the major reforms that have been passed over the last six years, 
i.e. in response to the Sovereign Debt Crisis in Europe. There is not enough space to discuss all of 
them, so I will focus only on those that are of particular importance for the structural transfor-
mation of the EU in its economic governance dimension. Reforms began in 2010 when Greece was 
essentially cut off from the money supply of financial markets and thus left unable to refinance 
itself. The immediate response was the creation of an emergency fund, the so-called European Fi-
nancial Stability Facility (EFSF), which was transformed into the permanent European Stability 
Mechanism (ESM) in 2012. The funds from EFSF and ESM come with some serious strings attached 
as it is only made available under strict conditionality. Typically, what is required of countries 
requesting the money is an agenda of ‘structural reforms’ aimed at reducing deficits and increas-
ing competitiveness and which, inevitably, involves austerity measures. It is incumbent upon the 
‘Troika’, consisting of the ECB, International Monetary Fund and European Commission, to mon-
itor and assess the progress with regard to this reform agenda. The decision to release the next 
tranche of money is based on this assessment and it can be withheld if the reform process stalls.  
In 2010 two more reform packages were initiated, which were both passed or ratified with-
in the following two years. First, there was the Treaty on Stability, Coordination and Governance, of-
ten dubbed ‘Fiscal Compact’. This international treaty (not signed by the Czech Republic and the 
United Kingdom) contains several measures, but its most important element is the stipulation 
that signees introduce a national balanced budget rule, preferably on the constitutional level, that 
would effectively limit deficits and debt to a certain percentage of the GDP.  
The other major reform proposed by the Commission in 2010 and passed by the council in 
2011 is the so-called Six Pack, containing five regulations and one directive, and introducing 
among other things a new instrument, the so-called (Excessive) Macroeconomic Imbalance Procedure 
(MIP), which is similar in design to the already existing Excessive Deficit Procedure. We will return 
to this instrument to prevent and correct major economic imbalances between the national econ-
omies of EU member states that translate into imbalances of relative competitiveness in the next 
section for a more extensive discussion.  
The last reform I will consider is the so-called Two Pack initiated in 2011 and passed in 
2013, which introduced the European Semester. The European Semester is designed to structure 
the budget cycle of a fiscal year and increase the supranational monitoring of national budgeting 
processes. Among other things, this complements the Six-Pack in various aspects, especially with 
regard to the matter of excessive deficits, as it specifies the obligations of member states in 
providing information on their public finances to the European Union and details which Europe-
                                                                                                                                                                       
https://doi.org/10.1080/09540962.2014.908003, for the European Commission and Wolfgang Streeck (2015) ‘Hel-
ler, Schmitt and the Euro,’ European Law Journal 21: 361-370. https://doi.org/10.1111/eulj.12134 for the ECB.  
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an institutions are involved in what way at a particular point in the process. We will return to the 
details of this provision in the next section as well.26  
Finally, let us take a look at the existing literature, which, literally, amounts to one single 
but very important text. It is stunning to read Stephen Gill’s article “European Governance and 
New Constitutionalism” today, because when he writes about measures that “mandate strict fis-
cal discipline as part of new practices of economic governance that will give credibility to gov-
ernments and confidence of investors”27, it sounds as if he is describing the rationale of most of 
the reforms since 2010. However, Gill wrote this in 1998 and refers not to the Fiscal Compact or 
the Six Pack, but rather to the pact that the latter are all designed to tighten or otherwise amend, 
namely the Stability and Growth Pact (SGP) from 1996/97 that was to ensure that the future Euro-
pean currency would be a stable and strong one. The SGP introduced the deficit (3 per cent of 
GDP) and debt limits (60 per cent of GDP) that are now supposed to be more effectively enforcea-
ble through the reforms passed in recent years. To my knowledge, Gill’s article is the only case in 
which a vaguely Foucauldian perspective is adopted to analyze the workings of disciplinary 
power in the realm of macroeconomics, so it is obviously an important reference point for my 
endeavors. At the same time, Gill’s otherwise excellent article is disappointing if one expects a 
Foucauldian analysis – an expectation that is not a stretch, considering that the subtitle of the arti-
cle reads “Economic and Monetary Union and Alternatives to Disciplinary Neoliberalism in Eu-
rope” (my emphasis). It turns out, though, that Gill subscribes to a more Gramscian approach, 
and while he invokes the Foucauldian connotations of the terms ‘disciplinary’ or ‘normalization’, 
his study focuses on rationale and effects of “disciplinary neoliberalism,” but it offers no analysis 
that elucidates how exactly the respective disciplinary power operates in detail. When it comes to 
understanding the “modalities of panoptic power” in the EU, therefore, the article has far from 
exhausted the possibilities of Foucauldian scholarship.28  
                                                 
26 These are not the only reforms passed, but the so-called Euro Plus Pact from 2011 did not include any legal 
obligations. By all accounts it was not made use of in a significant manner and is now described as being in a 
state of dormancy. The other reform I leave unaddressed is the Banking Union, agreed on in 2014, because the 
monitoring and auditing to be done by the ECB now concerns banks, the large majority of which are private 
financial institutions, whereas I am interested in the disciplining of national economies. Furthermore, in the fol-
lowing I focus on the Six-Pack and Two-Pack because in my view the other reforms do not add anything to the 
logic of discipline and to some extent even overlap with the ones analyzed in their thrust (Six-Pack and Fiscal 
Compact), or they are mostly designed to respond to emergency situations (ESM). Six-Pack and Two-Pack are 
about the establishment and continuous operation of a disciplinary-governmental regime – even if there is no 
crisis.  
27 Stephen Gill (1998) ‘European Governance and New Constitutionalism: Economic and Monetary Union and 
Alternatives to Disciplinary Neoliberalism in Europe,’ New Political Economy 3: 5-26, 8. 
https://doi.org/10.1080/13563469808406330.  
28 See also Stephen Gill (1995) ‘The Global Panopticon: The neo-liberal state, economic life and democratic surveillance;’ 
Alternatives 20: 1-49. https://doi.org/10.1177/030437549502000101.  




This also applies to the way in which the workings of power are analyzed. Gill is highly 
critical of the ‘new constitutionalism’ and its logic of “subordinating democracy to the dictates of 
a neoliberal restructuring of state finances,” and calls for a “coalition of counter-hegemonic forc-
es” to challenge the hegemonic notions on central bank independence, fiscal discipline and mar-
ket efficiency that sustain this new institutionalism discursively.29 This is obviously an analysis 
with strong normative overtones. There is no doubt that in the context of contemporary Europe 
strong normative opinions seem warranted. Warnings of an impending authoritarian turn in Eu-
ropean governance are no longer just heard from marginal voices within political discourse, but 
have come to resonate with and are echoed by more mainstream political economists and scholars 
from other disciplines as well.30 Still, the reformed economic governance of the EU may very well 
be authoritarian, undemocratic, technocratic and inhumane in cases like Greece, but in this article 
I will follow the lead of Foucault’s non-normative framework of analysis and focus exclusively on 
the modalities of power at the heart of this new governance structure.  
 
Visibilization / Constitution 
Famously, Foucault characterized disciplinary power as a productive or constitutive power that 
was capable of bringing phenomena into existence on the basis of a certain knowledge and in-
scribe them into a regime of truth, i.e. enable the formulation of true and false statements about 
them: “In fact, power produces; it produces reality; it produces domains of objects and rituals of 
truth.”31 Crucial ingredients to this productive power are techniques of visibilization: “The exer-
cise of discipline presupposes a mechanism that coerces by means of observation; an apparatus in 
which the techniques that make it possible to see induce effects of power, and in which, converse-
ly, the means of coercion make those on whom they are applied clearly visible”; discipline “im-
poses on those whom it subjects a principle of compulsory visibility.”32 But what does this mean 
when the object of discipline is not a person but a national economy? Foucault’s governmentality 
lectures provide some clues how to answer this question. After all, here the object of government 
was the population; a phenomenon similarly abstract as a national economy. According to Fou-
cault, the key to the ‘invention’ of the population is a certain (scientific) knowledge about birth 
rates, death rates, etc. and based on this knowledge a conglomerate of living beings is trans-
formed into a ‘population’ with specific characteristics. Something similar takes place in the case 
of a national economy. This entity could only be invented on the basis of a certain economic, 
econometric and statistical knowledge that served to build the respective models. Thus, the no-
tion of a national economy is invented as something ‘in the true’, i.e. a phenomenon about which 
                                                 
29 Gill, ‘European Governance ‘, p. 17; 22. 
30 See for example the contributions to the special issue of the European Law Journal on ‘authoritarian liberalism‘. 
European Law Journal 21 (3), 2015. 
31 Foucault, Discipline and Punish, p. 194. 
32 Ibid., pp. 170/71; 187. 
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true and false statements are possible and which is now ‘visible’ even though it lacks an empirical 
referent, strictly speaking.  
Still, for governing purposes an additional ingredient also emphasized by Foucault is 
needed, namely the average birth, death or disease rates, and how they are distributed across the 
population etc. Discipline requires not only the visibilization of its object, whether it is population 
or an economy, but also a measure to express what is normal; in other words, what is required is 
a norm. The ‘Economic Scoreboard’ of the MIP is exactly such a measure that makes visible cer-
tain aspects of an economy as well as its potential ‘anomalies’, and thus enables a surveillance 
mechanism to be established.  
 
Fig. 1: Economic Scoreboard of the Macroeconomic Imbalance Procedure 
 
Indicator Measurement Accepted Range 
Current Account Balance 3-year moving average, % of GDP Between +6 % and -4% 
Net international investment 
position 
% of GDP > -35% 
World export share In current value, 5-year percentage change > -6% 
Real effective exchange rate Vis-à-vis 35 industrial countries, based on con-
sumer-price indices, 3-year percentage change 
-/+ 5% (euro-area) 
-/+ 11% (non euro-area) 
Nominal unit labor cost 3-year percentage change < 9% (euro area)  
< 12% (non euro-area) 
Private Sector Debt % of GDP < 160% 
Private Sector Credit Flow % of GDP < 15% 
House prices relative to consumer 
prices 
Year-on-year changes, in % < 6% 
General government debt % of GDP < 60% 
Unemployment rate 3-year moving average, in % < 10% 
 
The scoreboard of the MIP is essentially a ‘table’, the use of which Foucault only considered in 
passing in Discipline and Punish: “In the economy, it makes possible the measurement of quanti-
ties and the analysis of movements.”33 The significance of the scoreboard goes beyond this in two 
respects. First of all, the very existence of something like a macroeconomic imbalance is based on 
this compilation of ten indicators which, supposedly, enable us to make true/false statements 
about the condition called macroeconomic imbalance. To put it pointedly, the scoreboard and the 
techniques of knowledge generation that enable and sustain it are the basis of its very existence. 
Secondly, this table (and arguably any table) is a device to generate a norm.  
 
Normation / Normalization 
What is the norm in question and how does it operate? Since the MIP refers to ‘imbalances’ or, at 
times, ‘excessive imbalances’, it seems plausible to infer that ‘balance’ or ‘non-excessive imbalanc-
                                                 
33 Ibid., p. 149. 




es’ are the norm. Still, a closer look shows that things are not as straightforward as that. The first 
thing to notice is the heterogeneity of the indicators. They range from nominal unit labor cost to 
real estate prices, and from the current account balance to overall government debt. They obvi-
ously cut across the distinction between public and private sphere as well as state and economy, 
and one could also add that some of these indicators are well within the scope of governmental 
action, whereas others (e.g. house prices) seem a little out of range. With regard to what exactly is 
being taken into consideration in the diagnostic assessment, note the difference between the vari-
ous measurements in the middle column. At times it is state variables that are mostly measured 
relative to GDP, but in other instances it is flow variables, and in still some other cases it is dy-
namic variables measuring (average) changes over a certain period of time. But the construction 
of a norm would be incomplete without the last column in which the ‘accepted range’ of deviance 
of all of these variables is defined. As can be seen, this range is at times as broad as 35 per cent 
and can be as narrow as 6 per cent depending on the indicator in question. The Scoreboard is part 
of a so-called Early Alert Mechanism, i.e. when one or more of the variables moves beyond the 
threshold specified, in-depth country reports must address the question as to how serious the 
‘excess’ is; possibly leading to a preventive or, eventually, even a ‘corrective’ procedure. We will 
take a closer look at the details of these procedures below. 
To the non-expert, this table conveys an air of arbitrariness. Why these indicators, why 
these different ways of measuring them and why the widely varying ranges of acceptable devi-
ance, one may want to ask. However, while it would be worthwhile to take a closer look at the 
potential scientism inherent in the design of this scoreboard that assumes nothing less than its 
ability to identify an equilibrium with regard to relative competitiveness, which is no small feat, 
this would take us too far into economic and econometric territory.34 Instead, I would first like to 
simply note what a complex operation this construction of a far from self-evident norm is. Still, 
what is even more interesting is to look at this norm using Foucault’s reflections on different 
kinds of norms and how they operate. In Discipline and Punish Foucault had not yet systematically 
distinguished between different kinds of norms and their varying effects. Here he still refers to 
norms that could “function as a minimal threshold, as an average to be respected or as an opti-
mum towards one must move”; the norm’s overall effect being that “it normalizes”.35 The govern-
mentality lectures, in contrast, begin with a detailed discussion of the differential functioning of 
norms. Discipline and Punish maintains that “the order that the disciplinary punishments must 
enforce is of a mixed nature: it is an ‘artificial’ order, explicitly laid down by a law… […] But it is 
also an order defined by natural and observable processes […].”36 Now, Foucault deems it im-
                                                 
34 There is a debate over the usefulness and potential defects of the scoreboard among economists and public 
policy analysts. See for example Daniel Mügge (2016) ‘Studying Macroeconomic Indicators as Powerful Ideas,’ 
Journal of European Public Policy 23: 410-427. https://doi.org/10.1080/13501763.2015.1115537.  
35 Foucault, Discipline and Punish, p. 183.  
36 Ibid., p. 179. 
Foucault Studies, No. 23, pp. 63-85 
 75 
portant to overcome this ambiguity and distinguish between two types of norms. In the realm of 
discipline “there is an originally prescriptive character to the norm and the determination and the 
identification of the normal and the abnormal becomes possible in relation to this posited 
norm.”37 Due to the primacy of the norm in this constellation, Foucault now wants to refer to such 
disciplinary techniques as “normation (normation) rather than normalization.”38 In contrast to this 
there is a different way of generating a norm, which is based on the normal, i.e. empirical averag-
es. Foucault identifies this with the workings of ‘security’ and what “is involved here is no longer 
normation, but rather normalization in the strict sense.”39 Discipline identifies a desired state of 
affairs or condition and its mechanisms work tirelessly to get its object closer to whatever that 
norm was. Security (and in the lectures this often blends into governmental management) instead 
investigates what is normal, i.e. birth and death rates of a population, lays down what is essential-
ly an empirical norm and only intervenes in case the ‘actual’ deviates too far from the ‘natural’. 
Security is more about “the delimitation of phenomena within acceptable limits, rather than the 
imposition of a law that says no to them.”40  
Adopting this distinction, is the MIP a disciplinary or a security mechanism? Does it aim at 
normation or normalization in the Foucauldian sense? The answer is that both logics are at work 
in the case of the economic scoreboard, so here we have a case in which the logics of discipline 
and government are almost amalgamated. First of all, it is hardly possible to characterize the var-
ious indicators and the values that are considered to be desirable as natural in the sense of simple 
empirical averages. Just consider the most obvious case in point: the general government debt 
should be below 60 per cent of GDP. However, in 2014 the average debt in the EU was 87 per cent 
of GDP and in the Eurozone it was even higher. However, one could argue that the prescriptive 
values of the scoreboard are not chosen arbitrarily but on the basis of long-term assessments of 
sustainable and competitive national economies. They are, so to speak, the key parameters of a 
‘normal’ competitive national economy – although significant doubts remain as to whether such 
knowledge is reliable or even attainable.  
The mechanisms of the MIP are also ambiguous when it comes to the timing and rationale 
of intervention. Given that a range of acceptable variance is explicitly part of the mechanism, and 
the MIP in its corrective arm is only initiated when one or more variables move beyond the toler-
ated range and a consecutive in-depth report confirms the problem, we can discern the logic of 
security. Still, as we shall see below, the MIP (in its corrective dimension) is already the last resort 
in a highly gradualized system of surveillance and, if needed, sanctions. After all, even in the case 
of a state remaining just under 60 per cent of government debt, the European Commission will 
still use all available tools of the preventive arm to ‘encourage’ the country in question to become 
                                                 
37 Foucault, Security, Territory, Population, p. 57. 
38 Ibid. 
39 Ibid., p. 63. 
40 Ibid., p. 66. 




even more fiscally disciplined, as the following section will show. Hence, a genuinely disciplinary 
element is detectable as well. In sum, let us firstly keep in mind the considerable complexity in-
volved in the construction of a norm in the case of the MIP and, secondly, the ambiguity of this 
norm that is in part prescriptive, but could also be said to capture some aspect of the normal as it 
exhibits traits of both normation and normalization.  
 
Prevention 
Disciplinary power in the context of punishment is at least as concerned with some kind of retri-
bution for a past crime as it is concerned with the prevention of potential crimes in the future. 
Arguably, this is one of the most powerful lines of argumentation in Discipline and Punishment, 
showing that the assessment of prospective risks (calculable) and dangers (incalculable) becomes 
an integral part of a form of punishment that is drawn out into a process of continual assessments 
and re-assessments of the danger/risks particular individuals or groups pose. In Foucault’s 
words, the shadowy figure of the delinquent appears behind the criminal, and the former’s 
drives, motives, genetic heritage and somatic dispositions are the field upon which the new ‘sci-
ences’ of man from psychology to criminology will try to present themselves as reliable diagnos-
tics of these traits of individuals, entering into a controversial but mutually beneficial cooperation 
with the penal institutions from judges to probation boards. Risk and prevention, however, are 
also of central concerns for governmental forms of power working through apparatuses of securi-
ty; so once again we must note the intertwinement of discipline and ‘governing’.41 
The new economic governance structures of the EU subscribe wholeheartedly to the pre-
ventive paradigm, as can be shown with reference to two particular reforms. The first is the Euro-
pean Semester briefly introduced above. Fig. 2 (see pp. 77–78) is a visualization of the process in 
its current form after some additional streamlining that was decided on in October 2015. 
Before we consider the preventive aspects on display, let us note how this process makes 
use of yet another tool from the disciplinary toolbox that Foucault mentions as well, namely “the 
control of activity”, not least through the “time-table” – and what else is the European Semester 
but a very elaborate and detailed time-table?42 Of course, Foucault is more interested in practices 
that would later be perfected in the form of Taylorism, but the principles and rationale are virtu-
ally the same. First, a complex process is broken down into its constitutive elements, and then the 
sequencing and timing of these elements is laid out in a most detailed manner. This technique 
may be used on the shop floor as well as in the European budgetary process. In the latter case, the 
 
                                                 
41 On the ‘governing’ of risk, see particularly the work of Pat O’Malley, e.g. (2004) Risk, Uncertainty and Govern-
ment. New York: Routledge.  
42 Foucault, Discipline and Punish, 149. 
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sequencing of four timelines for four actors has to be coordinated throughout the entire fiscal 
year. What is being minimized with this tight schedule is uncertainty, undefined time, potential 
for deliberate delays and idle months in which national governments may consider strategies of 
shielding themselves against the influence of the supranational institutions. We may also note in 
this process what Foucault called “the swarming of disciplinary mechanisms.”44 Here, it is not just 
the European Commission, which in many other cases inhabits the tower at the center of the su-
pranational Panopticon, but many other actors who are involved in a constant back and forth of 
prospects, reports, recommendations, reactions and conciliations, in which all of these actors 
seemingly monitor each other to some extent.  
However, the main point about the European Semester is its overall preventive thrust. 
Disciplinary power is about constantly assessing virtual dangers and risks in order to prevent 
them, ideally, from ever becoming reality in the first place. At least, this is the vanishing point of 
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preventive logic. The European Semester is the orchestrated attempt to detect and assess potential 
risks looming in national budgetary plans and work towards respective revisions long before na-
tional parliaments get to vote on them – or even see them. The underlying rationale is easily un-
derstood: Not only is it much more difficult to demand changes on a fait accompli, i.e. a budget 
that has been passed by a national parliament in expression of its core power, it can also turn out 
to be more costly if risks of deficits, imbalances etc. are not addressed before they materialize. 
Needless to say, the preemption of excessive deficits etc. according to the European Semester 
could also spell the “preemption of democracy”45 in important aspects, i.e. the control over na-
tional budgetary processes. But as mentioned above, the question I pursue here is not whether the 
new European governance structures are (il-)legitimate, but how the disciplining/governing of 
national economies through these structures works.  
The preventive dimension that seems crucial to the workings of disciplinary power is also 
an important part of the two main Procedures that deal with excessive deficits and excessive mac-
roeconomic imbalances respectively. Let me quote from the official description of the MIP:  
 
The MIP has two arms, preventive and corrective […] These two arms have different objectives: the pre-
ventive arm helps Member States to adopt good policies that will lead to balanced medium-term 
growth, jobs and financial stability. The corrective arm aims to identify and correct policy failures or 
address major macroeconomic risks […].46  
 
The preventive arm of the MIP sounds particularly benevolent, but it is also a quintessentially 
disciplinary element and possibly even more important in that respect than its corrective equiva-
lent. After all, the latter is only to be activated once a country has overstepped the accepted range 
of variables discussed above, but the preventive arm is the one that also operates on those who 
are well within the accepted range yet are still considered to be more or less at risk to miss the tar-
get thresholds in the future – as we will see this is the large majority of countries. This brings us to 
a final and crucial ingredient to disciplinary techniques.  
 
Normalizing Judgement 
What exactly does the European Commission do throughout the European Semester and how 
does it attempt to install fiscal discipline and prudent economy policy in general at the level of 
national governments? Most importantly, it gathers information and generates knowledge about 
its flock of national economies to ‘know them all and each one individually’, to borrow a phrase 
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Paper 11/11. 
46  European Commission. Available online at: http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/economic_governance/ 
macroeconomic_imbalance_procedure/mip_framework/index_en.htm  




from Foucault’s Omnes et Singulatim.47 As Foucault notes, disciplines can only work on the basis of 
proper bookkeeping and smart visualization, “these small techniques of notation, of registration, 
of constituting files, of arranging facts in columns and tables” 48 . The veritable fervor of 
knowledge generation exhibited by the Commission and other institutions can even be ascer-
tained by the lay person by simply consulting the respective websites that offer access to an over-
abundance of documents. Among them are detailed individual recommendations as well as even 
more detailed country reports. Restrictions of space do not permit to quote extensively from these 
dossiers, which are as long as one hundred pages in the case of country reports. Suffice it to say 
that reports and recommendations pertain to practically everything from real estate markets in 
the Netherlands to pension systems in Austria, and from local government reform in Estonia to 
the sustainability of the health sector in Slovakia. They provide an in-depth assessment of the 
specifics of each national economy in combination with detailed strategies of improvement that 
ought to be pursued to close the gap between the current state of affairs and the norm. Foucault 
writes that:  
 
the other innovations of disciplinary writing concerned the correlation of these elements, the accumula-
tion of documents, their seriation, the organization of comparative fields making it possible to classify, 
to form categories, to determine averages, to fix norms.49 
 
This is exactly what the European Commission does on the basis of the detailed individualized 
knowledge it has been generating continuously, as one example of the many tables and classifica-
tory taxonomies used by the Commission shows. Keep in mind that discipline is highly nuanced 
and efficient, i.e. it intervenes, ideally, in just the right way to achieve its end, be it the production 
of ‘docile bodies’ or ‘competitive national economies’. The prerequisite is a detailed knowledge of 
the object and fine-grained classificatory schemes that suggest the individualized corrective 
measures to be employed. The MIP has such a classificatory scheme that charts the space this side 
of the corrective arm on the basis of no less than six categories with the first category being that of 
‘no imbalance’ (1). At the risk of tediousness, let me list all of the remaining five to illustrate how 
fine-grained and highly individualized this classification is: Countries may exhibit (2) imbalances 
which require policy action and monitoring, (3) imbalances which require decisive policy action 
and monitoring, (4) imbalances which require decisive policy action and specific monitoring, or (5) 
excessive imbalances which require decisive policy action and specific monitoring. Category (6) 
finally requires that the corrective arm be activated.  
Over the course of the fiscal year, the Commission approaches the various member states 
and confronts them with their findings, categorizations and recommendations. In the next round 
                                                 
47 Michel Foucault (1979) ‘’Omnes et Singulatim’: Toward a Critique of Political Reason,’ in Michel Foucault 
(1994) Power, pp. 298-325. New York: New Press. 
48 Foucault, Discipline and Punish, 190. 
49 Ibid. p. 190. 
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of consultations, progress is assessed, more recommendations are offered, country reports are put 
together and categorizations are upgraded and revised accordingly. The crucial leverage for the 
Commission in this process is their power to upgrade and downgrade national economies be-
tween the various categories according to their compliance with recommendations and general 
socio-economic developments. This exerts some pressure because with each downgrade a country 
gets closer to category (6), which means the corrective arm would be activated, and looming a 
little further down the road from there might be the dreaded Troika, whose involvement coun-
tries want to avoid at all costs because of the hardship and humiliation it usually brings. Coun-
tries under Troika administration are the equivalent of “the shameful class” Foucault discusses in 
Discipline and Punish, “for which special regulations were drawn up ‘so that those who belonged 
to it would always be separated from the others and would be dressed in sackcloth’”50 to deter 
and keep the other classes in line. In all of this the Commission can work on countries bilaterally 
or it can try to pit one or a group of countries against another and thus make use of a quintessen-
tially disciplinary technique that “individualizes by making it possible to measure gaps, to de-
termine levels, to fix specialties,”51 i.e. it exerts the power of “normalizing judgment”.52 
 
Productive Failure 
So far the implicit assumption has been that the aim of the reformed governance structures is the 
production of competitive national economies without excessive deficits or imbalances. Further-
more, the assumption has been that the new surveillance and sanctioning scheme works. Let us 
now shift the perspective and question each assumption. We will begin with the latter – and a 
theoretical argument taken from neoliberal thought.  
It is one of the curiosities of public choice theory that many of its proponents are among 
the most vocal supporters of some kind of balanced budget rule, although their theory is virtually 
incapable of consistently explaining how such a rule could ever be passed. After all, politicians 
are presumed to be utility maximizers and hence they will find it beneficial to engage in what 
public choice calls ‘rent-seeking’ transactions with parts of the electorate. Rents need to be fi-
nanced, and given the unattractiveness of raising taxes for politicians, generalized rent-seeking 
will likely result in deficits and debt, hence the need for a balanced budget rule.53 But if politicians 
benefit from the existence of rent-seeking, why would they ever make it prohibitively difficult by 
passing such a rule? The only answer available to public choice theory without violating its own 
core assumptions is that rules on deficits and fiscal prudence may be passed (and they really are, 
                                                 
50 Ibid., p. 182. 
51 Ibid., p. 194.  
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as we know) but when push comes to shove they will be watered down and ultimately disre-
garded.  
Whatever one thinks of public choice theory in general, in this case it may have a point. 
After all, the fate of the original SGP should serve as a cautionary tale regarding the limits of the 
kind of ‘rule-and-sanction’-regime the recent reforms have sought to tighten. Retrospectively, the 
original regime looks like a fair weather construction. That is to say, it worked well as long as 
there were no serious challenges, but as soon as they materialized it began to falter. The challeng-
es in this case were the economic heavyweights of Europe, France and Germany, both violating 
the SGP rules in the early 2000s. When they got away with just a political slap on the wrist, the 
credibility of the regime was eroding rapidly as it became clear to everyone that the rules could 
be violated with impunity – at least by some. The question is why anyone would expect the re-
formed regime to perform better than the original SGP framework. Sure, the screws have been 
tightened on potential and actual offenders with the measures discussed in this paper and a 
number of others like the reverse majority rule, which makes Commission recommendations in 
the corrective arm of the Procedures binding on member states unless there is a majority in the 
Council against them. Still, the example of the current situation of France (and to some extent Ita-
ly) offers grounds for skepticism regarding the effectiveness of the new regime. After all, the 
country has been in violation of the deficit rules for years now and, for whatever reason, the 
Commission has been unwilling to enforce them rigorously so far. Other examples like Germany 
and its exorbitant trade surplus, which should be an obvious candidate for excessive imbalances, 
could be added. This is, of course, purely anecdotal but as empirical studies on the effectiveness 
of fiscal rules show, doubts about the success of the new regime are clearly warranted.54  
But assessing the likelihood of success presupposes that we know what the regime is try-
ing to succeed at, which brings us to the first assumption mentioned at the beginning of the sec-
tion and the last clue I will take from Foucault’s investigation of disciplinary power and the pris-
on. The latter, he points out, has a remarkably poor record at delivering on what it is supposed to 
achieve, namely individual and general prevention of crimes through the determent and rehabili-
tation of criminals. On both counts the prison is a blatant failure. Therefore, Foucault explores the 
possibility of the function of the prison being of a different nature:  
 
But perhaps one should reverse the problem and ask oneself what is served by the failure of the prison 
[…] one would be forced to suppose that the prison, and no doubt punishment in general, is not intend-
ed to eliminate offences, but rather to distinguish them, to distribute them, to use them; […] Penality 
                                                 
54 For an overview, see Charlotte Rommerskirchen (2015) ‘Fiscal Rules, Fiscal Outcomes and Market Behavior,’ 
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would then appear to be a way of handling illegalities […] it ‘differentiates’ them, it provides them with 
a general economy.55 
  
Analogously, if the production of fiscally prudent states with competitive national economies is 
the goal, the revised governance structures turn out to be as much of a failure as the prison is with 
regard to its proclaimed aims: As of early 2016, the number of countries that fall into category (1) 
of the MIP, meaning there is no imbalance, is zero. However, no less than 16 countries find them-
selves in category (2) - (5) and face the consequences outlined above, i.e. monitoring, policy rec-
ommendations etc. The majority of EU countries are still burdened with public debt well beyond 
the mark of 60 per cent of GDP, and seven countries are even in the corrective arm of the Exces-
sive Deficit Procedure – not counting Greece that is still under the special supervision of the Troi-
ka. Granted, success may take some time, but as of yet the system is not performing well. 
So could it be that the new governance structures could serve another purpose? Foucault’s 
answer to the ‘puzzle’ of the prison is that it is really good at the production of delinquency, i.e. a 
milieu of (petty) criminals that can be used for a number of purposes, be it the diversion from 
high crime in other milieus or as a reservoir of informers that can be pressured by the police as 
former inmates, at-risk youth or repeat offenders on probation etc. What if the unintended ‘func-
tionality’ of the regime lay in the equivalent of this, namely the production of economic delin-
quency? The various Procedures may not be particularly effective in making the national econo-
mies comply with the rules they are supposed to enforce, but it is a system that lends itself well to 
‘managing’ these economic ‘illegalities’ and making use of them. After all, the most minor infrac-
tions are recorded, as are stubborn resistance against certain supranational precepts or, positively, 
docility even in the face of inconvenient recommendations. All of these differentials are possibly 
exploitable to gain leverage – not just by the European Commission but, in principle, also by 
member states against the Commission or vis-à-vis other member states. This is presumably the 
unintended result of a situation in which almost all or at least the large majority of European 
states cannot conform to the set norms and are consequently all delinquent to some degree.56 
What we see here is possibly an economy of power quite different from the official claims about 
principles and rationale of the new regime, and it might be one worth exploring in greater detail. 
Just consider the connection between the economic issues discussed here and the European mi-
gration regime. As it happens, it is Spain, Italy and Greece, located on the southern border of the 
Schengen area and thus holding a key position in making the various Dublin Accords work, that 
are also among those countries at the center of the controversy over fiscal discipline. Moreover, it 
happens to be Germany, one of the hardliners with regard to Southern European austerity re-
                                                 
55 Foucault, Discipline and Punish, p. 272. 
56 This situation of an almost generalized delinquency through indebtedness bears some resemblance to the me-
chanics of ‘governing by debt’, analyzed by Maurizio Lazzarato in (2015) Governing by Debt. Los Angeles: Semio-
text(e)/MIT and (2007) The Making of the Indebted Man: An Essay on the Neoliberal Condition. Los Angeles: Semio-
text(e)/MIT. 




quirements, that has a particularly strong interest in the border countries fulfilling their Dublin 
obligations of registering and accommodating refugees and asylum seekers rather than waving 
them through – towards Germany, Austria etc. It is not far-fetched to assume that coalitions of 
fiscally hawkish lender countries headed by Germany will instrumentalize the possibility of up-
grading and downgrading a country along the lines sketched out above as leverage in the con-
flicts over the European migration regime, while Italy or Greece may try the reverse strategy. This 
is just one example, but given that the large majority of EU countries are economically delinquent 
in one way or another, it is easy to imagine conflicts over other issues with other coalitions in-
volved which also aim to instrumentalize those economic infractions for purposes completely 
unrelated to fiscal prudency and macroeconomic imbalances. In this sense the regime is a failure 
that still turns out to be eminently useful.57 
 
Conclusion 
In this article I have tried to identify disciplinary/governmental mechanisms in the reformed eco-
nomic governance structures of the EU as elements of a more encompassing project of ‘governing 
Europe’. In this endeavor I have relied strongly on Michel Foucault’s analysis of disciplinary 
power but also, to some extent, his concept of governmentality. My aim has been to not just posit 
that certain procedures, mechanisms etc. may have disciplinary effects, but to unveil the modali-
ties of such disciplinary/governmental power in its very minutiae from the complex construction 
of a norm to elaborate timetables and fine-grained classificatory schemes that enable the categori-
zation of each and every national economy in any number of aspects. 
I have shown that the techniques of visibilization, normation/normalization, prevention 
and what Foucault calls ‘normalizing judgment’ all play a role in the new regime of surveillance 
and sanctions that has been established in response to the Sovereign Debt Crisis at the suprana-
tional level.  
Foucault’s analyses are often criticized for their alleged portrayal of power regimes as all-
encompassing, immune to resistance and becoming ever more efficient. But as his analysis of the 
prison in Discipline and Punish shows, Foucault was much more interested in what could be called 
the ‘productive failure’ of institutions and regimes that may not deliver on their proclaimed goals 
but, over time, are appropriated by other actors with different interests for other purposes. Along 
these lines I have argued that we should try to analyze the newly erected regime as a productive 
                                                 
57 It is important to add that I do not think of this as a functionalist explanation of anything (although Foucault’s 
way of putting it is somehow suggestive in this direction). It is simply a matter of making alternative uses of 
existing structures that are – for better or for worse – not particularly good at performing according to their stat-
ed purpose. The political world is populated by political ‘entrepreneurs’, bureaucrats and other actors that may 
have a sense of ‘opportunity structures’, or who simply do not know what they are doing when they put certain 
instruments to alternative uses and thus contribute to a dynamic that leads to a shift in the overall function of 
this instrument or to the purposes to which it is predominantly used. I think of these as completely contingent 
processes.  
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failure in this sense because its performance with regard to its stated goals is not exactly impres-
sive and it might take a productive shift in perspective to inquire into the alternative uses of the 
regime. I have only been able to gesture towards what such alternative uses might be in this pa-
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